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Kevin Hollenbeck and Sarah Klerk
Evidence about the 
Effectiveness of Public 
Training Programs for 
Incumbent Workers
A ublicly supported training for the 
most part is provided to nonemployed 
individuals. The Workforce Investment 
Act (WIA) like its predecessors, the 
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 
and Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA) targets public 
training funds toward individuals having 
difficulties becoming employed or facing 
worker dislocation. The rationale for 
this targeting is clear: shortening spells 
of nonemployment is likely to reduce 
public employment-conditioned transfer 
payments and increase the efficiency of 
the labor market. Furthermore, public 
subsidies overcome human capital 
investment borrowing constraints 
that may be especially severe for 
nonemployed individuals.
In addition to investments in job 
training for nonemployed individuals, 
the public also supports job training for 
employed workers and has done so for 
several years. One example of this type 
of support is economic development 
initiatives that include job training grants 
aimed at business attraction or expansion. 
These often take the form of customized 
training contracts with community 
or technical colleges for training the 
workers who will be employed in
expanded or newly opened facilities.
More recently, for retention and 
competitiveness reasons, states have 
turned to the subsidization of incumbent 
worker training. The dynamics of 
economic change, especially the relative 
shift away from manufacturing and 
toward services, are leaving some 
states with obsolete manufacturing 
capacity and, often, relatively highly 
paid dislocated workers who lack skills 
or have high mobility costs that impede 
their employment prospects. In response, 
states are investing public funds in 
training activities for existing workers to 
try to retain businesses.
Estimates suggest that the private 
sector invests approximately $50-$60 
billion a year on training {Training 2006); 
our own data suggest that only a small 
fraction of this spending (less than $500 
million, or about 1 percent) is publicly 
subsidized. The purpose of this article 
is to document this estimate and to 
provide evidence about the social rate of 
return on those investments. In fact, we 
find the rate of return to be substantial, 
suggesting that perhaps there is an 
underinvestment in incumbent worker 
training subsidization.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics from Subsidized Employee Training Survey, by Year
Year
Characteristic
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Calculated as total state spending from the first row of the table divided by percent of U.S. population in the 
eighth row.
State Investments in Incumbent 
Worker Training
Moore et al. (2003) document a 
total of 36 states that funded incumbent 
worker training in 1998-99 with a total 
budget of about $317.8 million. The U.S. 
GAO (2004) surveyed all 50 states plus 
the District of Columbia and found that 
23 states used employer tax revenues 
to fund "employment placement and 
training programs" in 2002. Those states 
reported spending $278 million on these 
activities, of which $202 million was 
on training. Note that these two sources 
are not directly comparable because the 
Moore et al. study refers to customized 
training expenditures that may come 
from any source of revenues, whereas the 
U.S. GAO study focuses exclusively on 
employer tax revenues.
In summer 2005, we surveyed all 
states about incumbent worker training. 
Thirty states responded, 22 of which 
provided expenditure information. Those 
22 states reported spending $324.3 
million on incumbent worker training 
in 2004. An extrapolation of this figure 
on a population basis yields a national 
estimate of approximately $591 million. 
This figure is considerably larger 
than either of the sources cited above, 
but according to our survey, the total 
spending had decreased every year for the 
prior four years. Between 2001 and 2004, 
there was a 30 percent decline. Table 1 
shows that the annual levels of spending 
on subsidized training in the responding 
states fell from about $433 million to 
$324 million (nominal dollars).
In all, our data suggest that states, 
on average, fund about 200-300 firms 
per year at a level of $40,000-$60,000 
per firm for incumbent worker training. 
The firms train 60-70 individuals, on 
average. Of course, these averages mask 
considerable variation across the states, 
but we believe they give the reader a 
sense of the types of subsidies in which 
the states are engaging.
Massachusetts Workforce 
Training Fund
Massachusetts has a program with 
a scale that is close to the "typical" 
state. In 1999, Massachusetts initiated 
a competitive grant program to support 
incumbent worker training. The 
Massachusetts Workforce Training 
Fund program is funded by an 
employer contribution of 0.06 percent 
on unemployment insurance taxable 
wages (a maximum of $8.40 per year 
per employee). In FY 2005, the program 
distributed through a competitive 
solicitation about $21.2 million to 209 
companies to train 25,669 employees. 
By regulation, the grants require a 100 
percent match from companies and 
may not exceed two years in length.
Table 2 Characteristics of Grants
The Upjohn Institute was awarded a 
contract to conduct an evaluation of the 
Massachusetts Workforce Training Fund 
Program. 1 This evaluation included site 
visits to nine firms that had been awarded 
grants and quantitative analyses of 
administrative data. The administrative 
data included information from the firms' 
applications for the grant and from an 
evaluation report that firms are required 
to complete to get final payment when 
their grants have ended.
Table 2 provides general descriptive 
information about the grants that were 
in the administrative data. The average 
grant was just under $60,000, trained 
about 100 workers, and lasted 18 
months. On average, the grant supported 
training costs of $1,284 per worker. In 
the typical grant, the company's match 
would be comprised of the employees' 
wages during training, so those costs 
would not be included in this figure. As 
would be expected, these averages mask 
considerable variation across firms.
What kinds of firms received 
grants? Table 3 provides descriptive 
information. Relative to the number 
of employers in the private sector 
economy, manufacturing employers 
are overrepresented. Over 65 percent 
of the grants have been awarded to 
manufacturing firms, whereas only 
14 percent of the state's private sector 
firms are in manufacturing. The average 
employment size of the firms was about 
310, but it ranged from 2 to over 11,250. 
About one-third of the grant recipients 
have less than 50 employees, whereas 
only about 12 percent have more than 
500. The median employment size is 
115. Just under 10 percent of the firms 
with training grants were nonprofit 
organizations, and about 9 percent were 
unionized.
The evaluation study offers the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts several
Characteristic Average








Employment Research APRIL 2007




Wood, paper, chemicals, plastic
Metal products, machines, electrical
Manufacturing, total
Retail: Books, music, general
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substantial and may indicate that states 
are underinve sting.
  Despite reaping substantial rates of
return, our survey of states suggests a
sharp decline in the level of funding for
such training.
More information on this project




1 . See Hollenbeck (2007) for a report on a
program evaluation of the Workforce Training Fund.
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administrative recommendations intended 
to improve the efficiency and efficacy 
of the program. In addition, as part of 
our program evaluation, we estimate 
rates of returns received by firms, 
workers, and the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, which acts on the behalf 
of its taxpayers. Using self-reported 
data from the companies that received 
grants, we calculate that workers receive 
approximately a 5.4 percent return to 
their participation in the training funded 
by the state and their employer. Firms 
received benefits in the form of profits 
on the increased productivity of trained 
workers and on the revenues received 
from retained or expanded employment. 
We estimate that their return was 
approximately 16.6 percent on the 
investments made with grant-matching 
dollars.
Massachusetts received fiscal 
benefits in the form of tax receipts from 
expanded economic activity. In fact, we 
approximate that since 1999, the state has 
generated about 5,570 new or retained
jobs, at a cost of about $8,750 per created 
job. We estimate an increase in state 
expenditures to support the population 
growth engendered by the employment 
growth. Netting this figure out of the 
increase in state revenues yielded a fiscal 
return of about 38.9 percent.
The estimated returns to workers, 
firms, and the state have considerable 
uncertainty associated with them because 
rather broad assumptions were used in 
developing the estimates, although we 
attempted to be conservative in these 
assumptions.
Summary
The evidence presented here implies 
the following:
  Public subsidy of incumbent worker 
training, especially in export-based 
firms, may be an effective economic 
development tool for states.
  The rates of return that accrue to 
states for their training subsidies are
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Ann Markusen
Better Deals for State 
and Local Economic 
Development
This article highlights some key issues 
discussed in the author s new book, Reining 
in the Competition for Capital, which is 
available now from the Upjohn Institute. Read 
the first chapter at http://www.upjohninstitute 
 org.
JLn early 2007, North Carolina "won" 
a $600 million Google server farm at 
a cost of around $260 million in tax 
abatements and grants by the state, the 
city of Lenoir, and Caldwell County. The 
city and county forgave 100 percent of 
Google's business property taxes and 
80 percent of its real estate taxes for 
three decades, even though Google will 
create only 210 jobs, many of which 
require advanced degrees that only a 
fraction of current residents possess. In
Effective economic development
requires strenuous reforms 
to produce good, long-term jobs
and improve efficiency 
and equity in the process.
negotiating the deal, Google demanded 
that lawmakers keep its name secret from 
the public, even from residents who were 
asked to sell their homes and properties 
for the project.
This case is typical of heightened 
global incentive competition in which 
companies face off against state and 
local governments in a "market for 
jobs." Increasingly, state governors and 
local mayors in countries as diverse as 
Australia, Brazil, and India are being 
pressed for similarly large grants and 
tax breaks under conditions of minimal 
transparency and where governments 
lack expertise to make good deals.
And in large metro areas, similarly 
huge sums are bid to influence where 
low-wage retailers like Wal-Mart and
Cabela's locate, with no net benefit to 
the region and negative consequences for 
existing smaller retailers.
Are incentives good, bad, or a mixed 
bag, and how do we know? In Reining 
in the Competition for Capital, top U.S. 
scholars and practitioners working on this 
issue explore the reasoning, evidence, 
and practice under incentive competition. 
Though working from disparate 
disciplines and points of view, all oppose 
either banning incentives altogether 
or continuing with the status quo. 
Rather, we argue, effective economic 
development requires strenuous reforms 
to produce good, long-term jobs and 
improve efficiency and equity in the 
process.
The Reasoning
There are three schools of thought 
regarding incentive competition. One 
school, stated succinctly by Burstein and 
Rolnick (1995), argues that incentives 
are both inefficient (they transfer 
consumer surplus to firms that would 
locate there anyway and interfere with 
optimal siting) and inequitable (they 
impose tax and public service burdens 
on existing firms and residents). This 
camp proposes that Congress tax away 
all such incentives, rendering them 
ineffective. Another school, an analogue 
to the famous Tiebout hypothesis about 
fiscal competition among fragmented 
local governments, argues that the status 
quo is efficient and should be left as is. 1 
The intricate logic of these positions is 
explored in the Markusen and Nesse and 
Thomas chapters of the book.
A third school of thought argues that 
in an integrating world economy where 
central governments are devolving 
responsibility for economic development






Chapter 1: Ann Markusen and 
Katherine Nesse, "Institutional 
and Political Determinants of 
Incentive Competition"
Chapter 2: Kenneth P. Thomas, 
"The Sources and Processes of 
Tax and Subsidy Competition"
Chapter 3: Peter Fisher, "The 
Fiscal Consequences of 
Competition for Capital"
Chapter 4: Adinda Sinnaeve, 
"How the EU Manages Subsidy 
Competition"
Chapter 5: Timothy J. Bartik, 
"Solving the Problems of 
Economic Development 
Incentives"
Chapter 6: Rachel Weber, 
"Negotiating the Ideal Deal: 
Which Local Governments Have 
the Most Bargaining Leverage?"
Chapter 7: William Schweke, 
"Do Better Job Creation 
Subsidies Hold Real Promise for 
Business Incentive Reformers?"
Chapter 8: Greg LeRoy, 
"Nine Concrete Ways to Curtail 
the Economic War among the 
States"
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SOURCE: Data prior to 1991 from U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
(1992, p. 120); data for 1991-2005 from U.S. Census Bureau (2006).
onto lower-level governments, often 
without the resources to do so effectively, 
we have no choice but to champion state 
and local governments' rights to shape 
their relatively open economies. Bartik, 
in his chapter, argues that increasing local 
employment can yield substantial net 
social benefits, especially if jobs go to 
existing local residents, if costs of serving 
incentivized businesses is less than the 
new revenues they generate, and if no 
better uses of public resources are on the 
horizon.
But the market for jobs and tax 
base is rife with failures, the authors 
in this collection say. Multilocational 
companies, the suppliers of jobs, control 
crucial information in the deal-making 
process and have greater power in 
bilateral negotiations. Through the 
remarkable rise of site consultancy as an 
intermediating institution, Markusen and 
Nesse argue, they are able to informally 
collaborate in extracting spending and 
tax breaks, while the public sector agents 
bidding for jobs are unable or are too 
intimidated to share information with 
each other. The result is a strong bias 
toward overestimating benefits, according 
to Bartik. Furthermore, the flurry over 
deal making obscures a longer-term 
erosion in the business share of public
sector revenues and often impoverishes 
"winning" local governments' future 
operating budgets, especially if firms fail 
or decamp in a short time for even lower- 
cost locations.
The Evidence
There are few long-term studies or 
data with which to evaluate promised 
jobs and tax base increments envisioned 
in deals of the past, but hard-hitting 
analyses are emerging. A path-breaking 
analysis of a recent North Carolina 
economic development initiative 
involving more than $ 1 billion in public 
sector liabilities found that only 4 
percent of the jobs created were actually 
induced by the program at an exorbitant
cost of nearly $40,000 per job (Luger 
and Bae 2005; Schweke chapter). In a 
pioneering study of 366 Ohio expansions 
between 1993 and 1995, Gabe and 
Graybill (2002) find that those receiving 
incentives overannounced employment 
targets but created no new jobs (in fact, 
reduced overall jobs), while those that 
did not receive incentives accurately 
forecast their job expansion and did 
create new jobs. Studying the extent to 
which incentives create jobs for existing 
residents, Bartik (1993) finds that in the 
long run, about 80 percent of new jobs in 
local economies go to outsiders.
The corporate income tax share of 
state revenues, Fisher's chapter shows, 
has dropped by 40 percent between 1980 
and recent years (Figure 1), an erosion 
he attributes largely to rising incentives 
and related changes in taxation practices 
aimed at competitiveness. As a result, a 
larger share of the public sector service 
burden, including that provided to firms, is 
borne by households in the form of sales 
and property taxes. Since these are highly 
regressive taxes, the net result is to shift 
the tax burden from the highest income 
households to the lowest (Table 1).
Reforming the Market for Jobs
The authors document many 
encouraging experiments for improving 
incentive competition currently in place 
as well as reform proposals for federal, 
state, and local levels. Sinnaeve, a top 
regulator of incentive competition at the 
European Commission, explains lucidly 
how the EU system of deterrence works. 
EU members are prohibited from giving 
incentives to firms except under certain 
circumstances and only then if they

































NOTE: Tax burdens are shown after the federal offset; that is, these are the net burdens on families 
after taking into account the deductibility of state and local taxes on federal returns for those who 
itemize (generally higher-income taxpayers).
SOURCE: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2003, pp. 118-119).
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apply to the Commission for permission. 
The exceptions involve less-developed 
regions, which may offer certain types 
of incentives for training, research, and 
technology, for instance to encourage 
new plants and offices. The EU system 
largely deters governments from bidding 
wars for existing plants, because under 
most circumstances, they would simply 
not be permitted. While the regulatory 
process is expensive, it restrains 
tremendous distortions and giveaways 
in business sitings worth many times its 
cost.
In the United States, many state 
and local governments have designed 
reporting requirements that raise 
transparency in bargaining and awards. 
Others have pioneered performance 
requirements in written contracts, often 
with penalties and repayment provisions. 
Weber, in her chapter, explores many of 
these and shows how they enable public 
sector economic developers, like good 
customers in any market, to get a better 
deal. She shows that some governments 
plan in advance what they want and 
are prepared for sudden requests and 
bidding wars, invest their public dollars 
in place-based assets rather than firm- 
based ones, and extend benefits only 
after firms have produced the jobs they 
promise. Clawbacks requirements that 
firms that renege on contracts pay back 
some or all of the incentives and job 
quality standards are increasingly being 
incorporated into deals, as is school board 
input on abatements and tax increment 
financing (the devotion of future tax 
revenue from increased property values 
to paying off bonds for improvements).
Incentive reform is a big and 
incremental project at local, state, and 
federal levels. Sunshine, claims LeRoy 
in his chapter, is the best antiseptic. He 
reviews the 12 states that already have 
some form of incentive disclosure, a few 
of those Virginia, Maine, and North 
Carolina include corporate income tax 
breaks. He also recommends disclosing 
state taxes paid to corporate shareholders. 
LeRoy argues that the adoption of state 
unified development budgets would 
enable citizens and decision makers to 
see the combination of spending and tax 
expenditures involved in all programs,
as a public interest group in Kentucky 
has pioneered for their state (Mountain 
Associates for Community Economic 
Development 2005). Markusen and Nesse 
and LeRoy recommend legally defining 
site consultants as lobbyists, blocking 
success fees that tend to escalate deal 
dollars, and ending dual agency and other 
practices that exacerbate market failures.
States can also restrain the 
contribution of incentives to sprawl. 
To curtail the economic war among the 
suburbs for retail, LeRoy recommends 
that states ban retail subsidies altogether 
except in depressed inner-city markets 
that are demonstrably underserved.
The federal government could 
considerably moderate incentive 
competition by creating federal carrots 
against job piracy. LeRoy notes that 
federal program funding has been held
To curtail the economic war
among the suburbs for retail,
states could ban retail subsidies
altogether except in depressed
inner-city markets that are
demonstrably underserved.
up to induce states to raise legal drinking 
ages and implement school reform. A 
share of economic development funding 
from the Federal Departments of 
Commerce and Labor could be held until 
states adopted certain reforms.
Overall, these seminal papers respond 
to a growing crisis in state and local 
finance, where high-profile recruitments 
cost community too much for the jobs 
created, or worse, leave them holding 
the debt bag when firms fail to perform. 
State and local responsibility for 
economic development is a growing 
reality everywhere in the world, and 
incentives are among the most powerful 
tools available. Like any market, this one 
would benefit from clearer information 
and a more level playing field. The 
authors in Reining in the Competition for 
Capital present models, evidence, and 
doable reforms that can help public sector 
economic developers accomplish that 
within the decade.
1. Tiebout (1956) argues that local governments 
in a metropolitan area compete to offer packages 
of public services at the best tax "price," thus 
optimally allocating resources when residents "vote 
with their feet" in choosing where to live.
Ann Markusen is a professor in the urban and 
regional planning graduate program and director of 
the Project on Regional and Industrial Economics, 
Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of 
Minnesota.
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This book explores the causes, char 
acter, and potential remedies for the 
growing spatial 
competition for 
capital. See page 
4 of this newslet 
ter for a complete 
list of contribut 
ing authors and 
chapter titles.
"This is a must 
read for those in 
local and regional 
planning who want to understand 
how they can compete effectively. 
The book is of tremendous value not 
only for U.S. economic-development 
planners, but also for those in Europe 
and other countries with decentralized 
fiscal systems. I highly recommend it." 
 Karen R. Polenske, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology
"Ann Markusen has done it 
again. [This book] is a provocative, 
comprehensive collection from an 
impressive range of experts only 
Markusen could have assembled. 
It is ideal for a course in economic 
development policy and well worth 
reading for practitioners and political 
leaders. I know of no other source 
that provides so much information 
and perspective on this contentious 
policy issue." Andrew M. Isserman, 
University of Illinois
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Strategies and Job Chains
in Local Labor Markets
Joseph Persky, Daniel Felsenstein, 
and Virginia Carlson
State and local economic development 
programs offer the promise of new jobs, 
yet those examining the employment- 
related results of 
such programs 
are often left 
with many 
questions. Who 
got the new jobs? 
Wouldn't many 
of those workers 
be employed 
anyway? What 
are the overall 
benefits to the community? Do gains 
trickle down to those most in need? 
These are basic questions that, because 
of difficulties in evaluating the effects of 
state and local economic incentives, are 
often left unanswered.
Persky, Felsenstein, and Carlson 
employ a "job-chains approach" to 
clarify the potential justifications for 
economic development subsidies and 
identify the limitations of such efforts. 
In addition, they estimate the number of 
job vacancies created by job changers 
as a result of a subsidized business 
investment or expansion and the extent 
to which gains are achieved by the 
unemployed and the underemployed.
"In addition to an excellent read for 
those who conduct impact assessment, 
this would make an excellent 
complementary text for a regional 
economic methods course." 
 Journal of Regional Science
179 pp. 2004 / $40 cloth ISBN 0- 
88099-309-X/ISBN-13 978-0-88099- 





Alan H. Peters and Peter S. Fisher
"This is an important book that local 
economic development researchers and 
practitioners must not miss. In addition 
to the analysis of 
enterprise zones, 









programs. The technical discussions on 
evaluation methods and the use of the 
Standard Statistical Establishment List 
are also useful guides for researchers."
 Journal of Planning Literature
"Considering the quality of previous 
economic development volumes 
published by the Upjohn Institute, 
'State Enterprise Zone Programs' has a 
tough act to follow. The authors rise to 
this challenge, with a book that expands 
enterprise zone research and which is 
a suitable companion to and extension 
of their previous work, 'Industrial 
Incentives' (1998). The result is an 
accessible, persuasive and sometimes 
provocative work that employment 
and public finance scholars, as well as 
policy-makers, will find of interest."
 Urban Studies
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